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	<title>Comments on: Improbable simple hypotheses are unbelievable</title>
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	<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/</link>
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		<title>By: paulfchristiano</title>
		<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/#comment-198</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[paulfchristiano]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2014 04:51:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/?p=236#comment-198</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[That&#039;s right---it&#039;s the combination of improbability and simplicity that makes a hypothesis unbelievable.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That&#8217;s right&#8212;it&#8217;s the combination of improbability and simplicity that makes a hypothesis unbelievable.</p>
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		<title>By: esrogs</title>
		<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/#comment-197</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[esrogs]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2014 04:49:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/?p=236#comment-197</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Does H have to be a simple hypothesis for this argument to hold? It looks to me like the math goes through as long as P(H) &lt;&lt; 2^(-&#124;H&#124;). Is that right?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Does H have to be a simple hypothesis for this argument to hold? It looks to me like the math goes through as long as P(H) &lt;&lt; 2^(-|H|). Is that right?</p>
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		<title>By: Itai Bar-Natan</title>
		<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/#comment-119</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Itai Bar-Natan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Dec 2013 16:15:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/?p=236#comment-119</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What if someone also assigns hypothesis S (that it is being simulated to fool it to believe something false) a probability disproportionately small?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What if someone also assigns hypothesis S (that it is being simulated to fool it to believe something false) a probability disproportionately small?</p>
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		<title>By: paulfchristiano</title>
		<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/#comment-108</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[paulfchristiano]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Jan 2013 23:04:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/?p=236#comment-108</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I agree that something odd is going on when we talk about the beliefs of matrix-dwellers. I think for mathematical statements, or predictions about your future observations, you can make my argument go through. I&#039;m not prepared to admit other classes of statements as meaningful on their own (instead adopting something like model-dependent realism), and I&#039;m even a bit shaky about &quot;predictions about your future observations,&quot; though that&#039;s more a statement about our collective philosophical ignorance than my own radical skepticism.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree that something odd is going on when we talk about the beliefs of matrix-dwellers. I think for mathematical statements, or predictions about your future observations, you can make my argument go through. I&#8217;m not prepared to admit other classes of statements as meaningful on their own (instead adopting something like model-dependent realism), and I&#8217;m even a bit shaky about &#8220;predictions about your future observations,&#8221; though that&#8217;s more a statement about our collective philosophical ignorance than my own radical skepticism.</p>
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		<title>By: Qiaochu Yuan</title>
		<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/#comment-107</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Qiaochu Yuan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 05 Jan 2013 07:06:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/?p=236#comment-107</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[So I agree that if I talked about my own experiences in a world where I was recently put into a simulation against my will and without my knowledge, &quot;I will see the sun rise tomorrow&quot; would be false because my notions of seeing and the sun both derive from a level of reality above the simulation. This is much less clear to me if I have lived in the simulation my entire life, either because I was born into it a la the Matrix or because I am actually a simulated being who has no independent existence outside of the simulation; in that case, my notions of seeing and the sun both derive from the simulation itself, so I think I would still mark &quot;I will see the sun rise tomorrow&quot; as true if I see the sun rise in the simulation even if the actual sun failed to rise.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So I agree that if I talked about my own experiences in a world where I was recently put into a simulation against my will and without my knowledge, &#8220;I will see the sun rise tomorrow&#8221; would be false because my notions of seeing and the sun both derive from a level of reality above the simulation. This is much less clear to me if I have lived in the simulation my entire life, either because I was born into it a la the Matrix or because I am actually a simulated being who has no independent existence outside of the simulation; in that case, my notions of seeing and the sun both derive from the simulation itself, so I think I would still mark &#8220;I will see the sun rise tomorrow&#8221; as true if I see the sun rise in the simulation even if the actual sun failed to rise.</p>
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		<title>By: paulfchristiano</title>
		<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/#comment-106</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[paulfchristiano]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2013 09:00:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/?p=236#comment-106</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[That&#039;s a fair summary.

Indeed, for hypotheses like &quot;the sun will rise tomorrow,&quot; it&#039;s not clear what it means for that hypothesis to be &quot;true,&quot; since it depends on some model of &quot;the sun&quot;, &quot;will rise&quot;, and &quot;tomorrow.&quot; I think this is a common domain for philosophical debate, but I know little about that debate.

I don&#039;t think you should view sentences in isolation as things that get truth values. My take is that you have a few better-defined alternatives: you could talk only about your own direct experiences, you could talk about mathematical facts, or you could talk about statements about the world which don&#039;t make any ontological assumptions (where the last one is still philosophically fraught). 

So you might have a belief like &quot;I won&#039;t see the sun fail to rise tomorrow,&quot; which can be defined purely in terms of your own experiences (in a way that is robust to ontology shifts like the one you described---a formal definition of &quot;see the sun rise tomorrow&quot; could be applied directly to possible worlds where you discover you are in the matrix, to pass judgment on whether or not you saw the sun rise, after you woke up from the matrix). Or you might have a belief like &quot;in simple computer programs, observers like me live in bits of code that can be functionally modeled like ,&quot; which is a mathematical fact (where  involves a model of the earth and sun where the sun doesn&#039;t rise tomorrow). Or you could have a belief of the form &quot;The universe is made of space full of fields, and some of them are related to each other like .&quot; 

In any of those cases, learning you are in the matrix would just cause your belief to be automatically false.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That&#8217;s a fair summary.</p>
<p>Indeed, for hypotheses like &#8220;the sun will rise tomorrow,&#8221; it&#8217;s not clear what it means for that hypothesis to be &#8220;true,&#8221; since it depends on some model of &#8220;the sun&#8221;, &#8220;will rise&#8221;, and &#8220;tomorrow.&#8221; I think this is a common domain for philosophical debate, but I know little about that debate.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t think you should view sentences in isolation as things that get truth values. My take is that you have a few better-defined alternatives: you could talk only about your own direct experiences, you could talk about mathematical facts, or you could talk about statements about the world which don&#8217;t make any ontological assumptions (where the last one is still philosophically fraught). </p>
<p>So you might have a belief like &#8220;I won&#8217;t see the sun fail to rise tomorrow,&#8221; which can be defined purely in terms of your own experiences (in a way that is robust to ontology shifts like the one you described&#8212;a formal definition of &#8220;see the sun rise tomorrow&#8221; could be applied directly to possible worlds where you discover you are in the matrix, to pass judgment on whether or not you saw the sun rise, after you woke up from the matrix). Or you might have a belief like &#8220;in simple computer programs, observers like me live in bits of code that can be functionally modeled like ,&#8221; which is a mathematical fact (where  involves a model of the earth and sun where the sun doesn&#8217;t rise tomorrow). Or you could have a belief of the form &#8220;The universe is made of space full of fields, and some of them are related to each other like .&#8221; </p>
<p>In any of those cases, learning you are in the matrix would just cause your belief to be automatically false.</p>
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		<title>By: Qiaochu Yuan</title>
		<link>https://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/2012/12/11/improbable-simple-hypotheses-are-unbelievable/#comment-105</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Qiaochu Yuan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2013 00:37:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ordinaryideas.wordpress.com/?p=236#comment-105</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Is this a fair summary of your argument: suppose H is a simple hypothesis to which I assign a really small prior probability. Then seeing evidence of H is actually better evidence that I am in some sort of simulated reality where H only appears to be true. 

If so, I am confused about how one goes about even determining the meaning of H, let alone judging whether or not it is true, in sufficiently strange possible worlds, and maybe you can clear up this confusion for me. Suppose H = &quot;the sun will not rise tomorrow&quot; and that I assign to this hypothesis an extremely low probability. Tomorrow I observe that the sun has not risen. This appears to be evidence that the sun has not risen, but you say to me &quot;aha, it&#039;s actually evidence that you are living in the Matrix and the Matrix Lords are screwing with you, the actual sun totally rose.&quot;

Okay, but if I&#039;ve lived in the Matrix my entire life, then I learned the word &quot;sun&quot; in the Matrix, and if I dereference that pointer it actually refers to the part of the Matrix that simulates the actual sun, and that part really didn&#039;t do the operation that corresponds to rising! I have never seen the actual sun. There is nothing in my current vocabulary that can reasonably be said to refer to the actual sun. So in what sense is H false here?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Is this a fair summary of your argument: suppose H is a simple hypothesis to which I assign a really small prior probability. Then seeing evidence of H is actually better evidence that I am in some sort of simulated reality where H only appears to be true. </p>
<p>If so, I am confused about how one goes about even determining the meaning of H, let alone judging whether or not it is true, in sufficiently strange possible worlds, and maybe you can clear up this confusion for me. Suppose H = &#8220;the sun will not rise tomorrow&#8221; and that I assign to this hypothesis an extremely low probability. Tomorrow I observe that the sun has not risen. This appears to be evidence that the sun has not risen, but you say to me &#8220;aha, it&#8217;s actually evidence that you are living in the Matrix and the Matrix Lords are screwing with you, the actual sun totally rose.&#8221;</p>
<p>Okay, but if I&#8217;ve lived in the Matrix my entire life, then I learned the word &#8220;sun&#8221; in the Matrix, and if I dereference that pointer it actually refers to the part of the Matrix that simulates the actual sun, and that part really didn&#8217;t do the operation that corresponds to rising! I have never seen the actual sun. There is nothing in my current vocabulary that can reasonably be said to refer to the actual sun. So in what sense is H false here?</p>
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